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Crawford’s “Testimonial Hearsay” 
Category 
A PLAIN LIMIT ON THE PROTECTIONS OF THE 
CONFRONTATION CLAUSE 
Mark Dwyer† 
For those of us who are practitioners, this debate about 
the history of the Confrontation Clause might be fascinating.  
And it might be fascinating, as well, for us to hear speculation 
about where the law might or should go in the future.  But we 
have to worry primarily about the law now.  We practitioners 
cannot walk into a courtroom and tell the judge, “Sure there is 
Crawford v. Washington, but Justice Scalia got the history 
wrong, and so here is how you should let me try my case.”  That 
does not work.  So I start by recognizing the primacy of 
Crawford v. Washington.1 Any time that the Supreme Court 
makes that big of a statement, everything past is essentially 
irrelevant, and analysis must be based on the new case. 
However, while Crawford is important, its impact is not 
yet clear.  As a practitioner, I do not yet know where the courts 
will go in applying Crawford.  But I am not persuaded at all 
that Crawford applies to the same universe of statements that 
was covered by the old Ohio v. Roberts2 standard.  It is 
important to look at the language of Crawford, evaluating it in 
light of the now-discarded Roberts rule and common law 
precedent, to see where Crawford is taking us.  In my view, 
Justice Scalia’s Crawford opinion actually narrows the scope of 
the Confrontation Clause, given its emphasis on the category of 
“testimonial” hearsay. 
  
 † Mark Dwyer is the Counsel to the District Attorney in the New York 
County District Attorney’s Office, where he has been an appellate attorney for twenty-
eight years. 
 1 541 U.S. 36 (2004). 
 2 448 U.S. 56 (1980). 
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Under the rules of evidence, some out-of-court 
statements are admissible.3  Roberts harmonized the 
admissibility of some of those statements with the 
Confrontation Clause.  In doing so, Roberts threw a thin 
protective blanket over all hearsay declarations, but the 
blanket was permeable.  Under Roberts, hearsay could pass 
through the blanket and be admitted in court against a 
defendant if considered reliable.4 
Those who tend to favor excluding out-of-court 
statements – and that is a very honorable group of people – 
were not happy about how much hearsay was admitted under 
the Roberts rule.5  Their examination of history led them to 
argue for a new look at the purpose and reach of the 
Confrontation Clause.  Their approach was in effect endorsed 
in Crawford v. Washington.  No longer is the protection 
provided by the Confrontation Clause a permeable blanket; 
now it is a thick lead shield.  No hearsay statement gets by the 
Confrontation Clause and into court, even if it appears reliable, 
unless its maker is subject to cross-examination,6 with an 
exception only when the defendant has made the witness 
unavailable for cross-examination.7 
But the triumph of the historically-based argument 
underlying Crawford amounts to a devil’s bargain.  In order to 
get that thick shield against the introduction of hearsay 
statements by declarants who have not been cross-examined, 
the proponents based their argument on a history in which the 
Confrontation Clause did not extend to cover all hearsay 
declarations.  In that history, the Confrontation Clause is a 
shield only against “testimonial hearsay” – a subset of the 
whole.8 
Naturally, the people who advocated for the new rule – 
those who tend to favor excluding out-of-court statements – are 
pleased to see the thick lead shield now in place.  And being 
human, they want to have their cake and eat it too.  So they 
  
 3 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 803 (enumerating twenty-three exceptions to the 
hearsay rule). 
 4 Id. at 66. 
 5 See, e.g., Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In Testimony, 
150 U. PA. L. REV. 1171 (2002); Richard D. Friedman, Confrontation: The Search for 
Basic Principles, 86 GEO. L. J. 1011 (1998). 
 6 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 69. 
 7 Id. at 61 (“[T]he rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) 
extinguishes confrontation claims on essentially equitable grounds.”). 
 8 Id. at 51. 
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have proposed that the new, thick shield should extend about 
as broadly as the old Roberts blanket, over virtually all out-of-
court declarations.  Unfortunately for them, the theories they 
now press toward that end are not grounded in Crawford v. 
Washington or its historically-based rationale that only 
“testimonial” hearsay is covered by the Confrontation Clause.  
These theories are instead based on wishful thinking about 
what the reach of the Clause ought to be. 
I submit that nothing in Crawford justifies this hope 
that virtually all hearsay statements are still within the reach 
of the Confrontation Clause.  Some might now argue that the 
whole point of the Clause is to draw witnesses into court.  But 
in Crawford, Justice Scalia said that the point of the Clause 
was merely to exclude testimonial hearsay.9  Some might also 
contend that the Confrontation Clause would, if things were 
nice, be interpreted to exclude anything that is “accusatory.” 
But Justice Scalia said nothing like that in his opinion.  Noble, 
too, might be the goals of excluding hearsay that contains 
“prosecution” information, or of preventing abuses of state 
power.  But you cannot get there, as a way to interpret the 
Confrontation Clause, from the opinion in Crawford v. 
Washington. 
I am not saying that I am the only one who knows how 
to read a case; but as I read Crawford, the Supreme Court has 
defined “testimonial” hearsay so as to include only statements 
resembling a narrow class of formal statements disfavored by 
the common law by 1791 – statements that might have been 
tolerated under a civil law system of a similar vintage.10  
Justice Scalia had in mind to exclude affidavits and prior 
testimony.11  The Court will also now consider admissions to 
the police by co-defendants to be testimonial statements, but 
that seems to be related to the fact, as per Justice Scalia, that 
in Marian times magistrates interrogated suspects.12 Thus, 
station house interrogation that yields a statement is much 
like a Marian magistrate’s inquiry, and the statement must be 
considered court-like and “testimonial.” 
That is about all that Crawford says is “testimonial.”  
Excluded from Justice Scalia’s “testimonial” category, and thus 
from Confrontation Clause protection, are statements 
  
 9 Id. 
 10 Id. at 50-51. 
 11 Id. at 51. 
 12 Crawford, 541 U.S. at 44. 
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unrelated to the civil law “abuses” that the Justice is talking 
about.  Placing other types of statements within this 
“testimonial” category, to me, is simply wishful thinking.  
There is nothing wrong with wishful thinking, and I am not 
saying that any of these wishes are objectively bad.  But these 
wishes are not based on Crawford.  Let me comment on just a 
couple of the arguments that have been made for this wishfully 
expansive view of “testimonial” hearsay. 
One tactic is to say that a certain statement plainly 
should not be let in at a trial, and to conclude without much 
reasoning that the Confrontation Clause cannot be interpreted 
to let it in.  For example, civilian A, in order to get out of 
testifying, might give a statement to civilian B, expecting B to 
go to court and repeat it.  And it would be horrible should B’s 
hearsay testimony be admitted.  As this theory goes, such 
informal statements made without government involvement 
must be included in the category of prohibited “testimonial” 
statements.  Thus, in defining “testimonial” statements, there 
cannot be any rule that they be “formal” statements, or that 
the government be involved in their production. 
But I submit the conclusion does not follow.  We all 
agree that A’s statement to B should not come in at trial.  But 
to exclude the statement, it does not follow that we must call 
the statement “testimonial,” despite its informality and the 
lack of government involvement.  At least in New York, I 
predict, a “residue” of protection of the old Roberts blanket 
“reliability” sort will remain, so that even non-testimonial 
statements may be excluded under a state constitutional rule.  
But on top of that, simple evidentiary hearsay rules will keep B 
from testifying.  His testimony would be hearsay anywhere. 
If that is not right, still A’s statement to B is not 
“testimonial” under the Crawford examples.  Wishful thinking 
will not change that.  The devil’s bargain has been made.  A 
statement is not “testimonial,” and thus excludable under the 
Confrontation Clause, simply because those in a pre-Crawford 
mindset might not have thought that the Constitution should 
tolerate its admission.  The Confrontation Clause now excludes 
only a limited category of formal hearsay statements 
disapproved of in 1791, and not “non-testimonial” hearsay.  
Other sources of protection must be sought, under state law for 
example, if non-testimonial hearsay is to be deemed 
inadmissible. 
A second tactic to interpret Crawford expansively is to 
take a “functional” approach.  Rather than analogize to the 
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several types of statements that the Supreme Court has said 
are testimonial, this approach says that testimonial hearsay is 
any statement made by a declarant who knows it will have a 
law enforcement use.  I submit that this approach is far too 
broad.  Perhaps one might define “testimonial” hearsay as 
anything said to a law enforcement official that the declarant 
thinks will be repeated at trial.  But that is not to say that the 
expectation by the declarant that a statement will serve any 
law enforcement use is enough to make the statement 
testimonial.  If a robbery victim sees a cop coming and says, 
“Officer, that man robbed me,” he has no thought except that 
the criminal may be tackled and arrested.  The victim has no 
expectation whatsoever that his statement might be introduced 
in a grand jury or at a trial.  As I read Crawford, such a 
statement is not testimonial unless given under the expectation 
that it will serve as the equivalent of formal, in-court 
testimony.  There may still be an evidentiary hearsay problem 
if the statement is offered at trial.  But such a statement does 
not look “testimonial” to me. 
Relatedly, in New York, and I suspect elsewhere, the 
hottest topic these days involves how to classify 911 
statements.13  Some 911 statements seem to be pure cries for 
help; someone is bleeding and says, “Send an ambulance; he 
just hit me.”  As I see it, these statements bear no resemblance 
to the “testimonial” statements that Justice Scalia is concerned 
about in Crawford.  They do not seem at all like the formal 
statements admissible under civil law but not allowed into 
common law criminal proceedings in 1791.  You may say that 
those statements should not come in because of traditional 
hearsay rules.  But that does not make them “testimonial” 
under Crawford. 
Finally, it also seems to me that there is almost an 
equation to be made between declarations that are proper 
excited utterances and statements that are not testimonial.  
Perhaps the scope of the excited utterance hearsay exception 
should be narrower than current cases say it is.  But if a 
statement is truly “excited” because it is made before the 
opportunity to reflect – for example, to reflect on the chance 
  
 13 See, e.g., People v. Corella, 18 Cal. Rptr. 3d 770 (Ct. App. 2004); People v. 
Caudillo, 19 Cal. Rptr. 3d 574 (Ct. App. 2004); Pitts v. State, 612 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2005); People v. West, 823 N.E.2d 82 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005); People v. Moscat, 781 
N.Y.S.2d 401 (Crim. Ct. 2004); People v. Cortes, 777 N.Y.S.2d 875 (Crim. Ct. 2004); 
State v. Powers, 99 P.3d 1262 (Wash. Ct. App. 2004). 
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that the statement will be admitted at a trial someday – then 
by definition you cannot call the statement “testimonial.”  If 
hearsay rules do not exclude such a statement, after Crawford, 
there is no reason why the Confrontation Clause should. 
